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INTRODUCTION

The new South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provide the first extensive revision of procedure since 1870. Although they adopt the format,
numbering, and, in many instances, the language of the federal
rules, they retain certain features of prior South Carolina proce-
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dure, such as fact pleading and discovery limitations. The result
is a combination of the best parts of both systems.
The drafters of the new rules participated in a series of
seminars that concentrated on the operation of the rules in the
circuit courts and the major innovations in the new procedure.
These seminars, as well as comments by numerous lawyers and
judges, suggested the need to explore in greater detail the ambiguities in the service of process and discovery rules, the application of the new rules to inferior courts, and the relationship of
the rules to appellate practice.
The first section of this article will address certain ambiguities in the new rules. One issue raised by the rules concerns the
amount of time permitted for answering service by mail. Consideration of this problem will both illustrate the interrelationship
of the rules and demonstrate how examining the rules' history
and appropriate federal precedent can help resolve apparent
ambiguities. Another area of uncertainty is found in the language that the drafters added to the discovery rules. Although
prior practice and federal precedent do not provide any guidelines for solving these problems, a careful reading of the rules
and a logical approach can produce a suitable resolution.
The second section will consider the relationship of the new
circuit court rules to the lower courts and the masters in equity.
The circuit courts are part of a unified judicial system and must
function in harmony with all types of inferior tribunals. As a
result, the circuit court rules will affect all South Carolina courts
to some degree. Reconciling the procedure found in the new
rules with existing statutes and rules of the various courts is a
complex process; consequently, rule 81, on the applicability of
the rules, and rule 53, dealing with masters, will be discussed in
detail.
The final section will examine the interaction between the
circuit courts and the appellate courts. Although the rules were
drafted for the trial courts, language in the rules on post-trial
motions and in rules 52 and 72 can be interpreted as changing
appellate practice in significant respects. The discussion here is
not so much on the language, but on the proper scope of the
rules and the supreme court's intent in adopting them.
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II. AMBIGUITIES IN THE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND DISCOVERY
RULES

A. Rule 6(e)
Rule 6(e) provides:
Additional Time After Service by Mail or Upon Statutory
Agent. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail or upon a person
designated by statute to accept service, five days shall be
added to the prescribed period.'

The language of this rule is the same as in the 1958 Judicial
Council draft2 and differs only slightly from the comparable fed-

eral rule, 3 which does not contain the phrase "or upon a person
designated by statute to accept service." The South Carolina
drafters provided little guidance on the operation of the rule: the
1958 Judicial Council draft notes neither refer to the added language nor explain its operation, 4 and the advisory committee
note to new rule 6(e) is no more informative.' In addition, there
is no advisory committee note on the federal rule, which has remained unchanged since its adoption.' The most immediate is1. RULE 6(e), SCRCP.

2. Draft Rules of Civil Procedure were prepared by the Judicial Council of South
Carolina and submitted to the South Carolina General Assembly in 1958. They passed
the house, but failed in the senate by one vote. They were reintroduced in the senate the
following year and died in committee. Interestingly, many individuals involved in this
first attempt to change code pleading were instrumental in the recent successful amendment, most notably former Chief Justice C. Bruce Littlejohn, who, as a circuit judge,
chaired the 1958 committee, and Frank K. Sloan, who was the reporter for both
committees.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
4. The 1958 Judicial Council draft provided only the following commentary.
Rule 6(e) is identical with the Federal rule. Section 10-465, S.C. Code, 1952
[S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-950 (1976)(repealed 1985)] allows "double the time," a
provision not entirely clear. Priester v. Priester, 131 S.C. 284, 127 S.E. 18
(1925). The addition of three days [now five days] is commensurate with modern mail communication service. Code Section 10-465 should be repealed.
RULE 6, SCRCP note 5 (Jud. Council Draft 1958).
5. "This Rule 6(e) is the same as the Federal Rule except that the additional time to
take an act after service is by mail is increased from 3 to 5 days. This replaces the very
unclear meaning of Code § 15-9-950." RuLE 6(e), SCRCP advisory committee note.
6. J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK & C. THoMPsoN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
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sue raised by this rule is whether a party served with a summons
and complaint pursuant to rule 4(d)(8) is entitled to an additional five days to answer or otherwise plead. A second question
is whether the reference to service on statutory agents means
that the additional time is available only when the agent is
served by mail or whether any service on a statutory agent triggers the rule. Finally, it is uncertain how rule 6(e) affects the
computation provisions in rule 6(a).
1. Whether a Party Served with a Summons and Complaint
by Mail Is Allowed Additional Time to Respond
Service of the summons and complaint by mail is an innovation. Until recently only rule 5 mentioned service by mail, and
its operation was clear because it was limited to papers and notices other than the initial summons and complaint. Rule 5(a)
requires that those papers be served upon all parties except
those in default. Rule 5(b) requires that this service be upon
counsel rather than upon the parties and permits service by
mail. When service is by mail, the date a notice is mailed and
the date it is received are, of course, different. The last sentence
of rule 5(b) establishes the decisive date: "Service by mail is
complete upon mailing of all pleadings and papers subsequent
to service of the original summons and complaint."'7 Although
the mailing date completes service, the period for response is
shortened by the amount of time the notice or demand is in the
mail. This delay is particularly troublesome when the period to
respond is only seven or ten days. Rule 6(e) adds an additional
five days to the response period, thus compensating the responding party for the travel time of the mails and providing approximately the same time to respond as if personal service had been
made.
As a result, although a pleading subsequent to the summons
and complaint, such as an answer and counterclaim, is timely if
mailed on the thirtieth day after personal service of the sum-

6.01113] (2d. ed. 1985)(hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrIC.).
7. RULE 5(b), SCRCP (emphasis added).
8. FED. R. Crv. P. 6(e) provides for an additional three days when service is accomplished by mail.
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mons and complaint, 9 under rule 6(e) the response would be
timely if made within thirty-five days after the mailing date, regardless of the date of actual receipt.10 Similarly, a party served
by mail with a request to produce under rule 3411 or with a motion for summary judgment under rule 12(c) 12 would have an additional five days to respond after the mailing of the request.13
The question remains, however, whether a party served by mail
with a summons or complaint is also entitled to an additional
five days to respond.
Prior to 1983, the federal rules did not authorize service of
the summons and complaint by mail; thus, the question of
whether federal rule 6(e) extended the time to answer did not
arise. In general, the date of the receipt of the summons and
14
complaint was decisive for calculating the time to respond.

Therefore, even if mailing had been authorized, no need existed
for additional time to respond because the period would have
commenced upon receipt rather than upon mailing. Similarly,
prior South Carolina law specifically excluded the service of a
summons and complaint from the addition of "double time" af15
ter service by mail.

Thus, in its original context, federal rule 6(e) did not apply
to the computation of time for responding to a summons and
complaint. Federal case law limited the effect of rule 6(e) to

9. RULE 12(a), SCRCP.

10. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 6, 1 5.07.
11. Under RULE 34(b), SCRCP, a party has 30 days to respond after being served
with a request to produce.
12. Under RULE 12(c), SCRCP, a party has 15 days to respond after being served
with a motion for summary judgment.
13. Cf. Gutwein v. Roche Labs., 739 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984).
14. Cf. Norris v. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 730 F.2d 682
(11th Cir. 1984)(since 90-day period for filing employment discrimination complaint
commences upon receipt of right-to-sue notice, rule 6(e) does not add to the statutory
time period).
15. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-9-950, -1030 (1976) (repealed 1985). Prior state law did
present one situation that created problems. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-350 (1976) designates
the Chief Highway Commissioner as agent for nonresident motorists and motor carriers
for the purpose of receiving the summons and complaint. Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-9-370 (1976), the Chief Highway Commissioner, upon receipt of the documents, mails
them to the defendant. In Ward v. Miller, 230 S.C. 288, 95 S.E.2d 482 (1956), the South
Carolina Supreme Court held, on the basis of statutory language, that service was effective upon receipt by the agent and that the "double time" provision for extending the
time to answer did not apply. This interpretation reduced the actual time available for
the defendant or his insurance carrier to respond, leading to unnecessary defaults.
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matters of procedure rather than substance. Federal precedent
did not extend the time to take action when a statute or the
entry of the judgment or order commenced the time for action,"6
17
even though notice typically was given by mail.
In 1983 the United States Supreme Court submitted to
Congress proposed changes to federal rule 4, which authorized
service of the summons and complaint by mail under certain circumstances.' 8 Objections to portions of the proposed draft led to
congressional amendments designed to reduce the work load of
the marshal's service. 19 There was no discussion of the relationship between service by mail and federal rule 6(e) in either the
proposed or the adopted version of federal rule 4. Certainly, no
suggestion was made that rule 6(e) extended the time to respond
when served by mail. Moreover, the new federal rule required
the party served by mail to return an acknowledgement of receipt of the summons and complaint. Form 18-A clearly states:
"If you do complete and return this form, you (or the party on
whose behalf you are being served) must answer the complaint
within 20 days. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be
' 20
taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
The adoption of service by mail in the federal rules was not
intended to extend the time to respond or otherwise plead in
response to the complaint. In Madden v. Cleland,2 the only federal decision that has explicitly examined this issue, the district

16. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979)(notice of appeal); Perrin v. Walker, 385 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Ill. 1974)(petition
for removal); McConnell v. United States, 50 F.R.D. 499 (E.D. Tenn. 1970)(post-trial
motions). Occasionally, courts would apply the provisions of rule 6(e) to prevent an unnecessary loss of rights, but this was by analogy and only in the absence of any contrary
state or federal statutes. See, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 104 S.Ct.
1723 n.1 (1984).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d) requires the clerk to notify counsel of the entry of orders,
but the last sentence makes clear that the decisive moment is the entry of the order,
regardless of the actual knowledge of counsel or the failure of the clerk to mail the notice. New RULE 77(d), SCRCP reflects an earlier version of the federal rule and does not
contain this last sentence.
18. For text of the proposed amendments and advisory committee note, see 2
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE, supra note 6, %4.01[33.-2].
19. See H.R. 7154-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H9849 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982)(statement of Robert
A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18-A (Notice and Acknowledgement by Mail).
21. 105 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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court held that rule 6(e) did not apply when the summons and
complaint were served by mail.22 In Burnam v. Amoco
Container Co., 23 however, another district court, without analy-

sis, added the three days provided for in federal rule 6(e) to the
time for response to a complaint and vacated an entry of default
24

as untimely.

Service by mail of the summons and complaint is now authorized by South Carolina rule 4(d)(8). The language of this
rule was taken largely from the version proposed by the United
States Supreme Court, rather than the current federal rule
4(c)(iii). 25 The drafters of South Carolina rule 4(d)(8) modified

and rearranged the language of the proposed rule 26 and inserted
the following sentence: "Service is effective upon the date of delivery as shown on the returned receipt.

'2 7

Rule 5(b)(1) provides:

"Service by mail is complete upon mailing of all pleadings and
papers subsequent to service of the originalsummons and complaint."2 The italicized portion does not appear in federal rule
5(b); its inclusion in the new rule further emphasizes the intent

22. Id. at 525.
23. 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
24. Id. at 170.
25. The major difference between the state and federal rules is that the state rule,
following the Supreme Court's version, relies on the return receipt to establish acceptance of the process, while the federal rule requires return of FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18-A
(Notice and Acknowledgement for Service by Mail).
26. The federal rule as proposed by the advisory committee read as follows:
(8) Service of a summons and complaint upon a defendant of any class referred
to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subsection of this rule may be made by the
plaintiff or by any person authorized to serve process pursuant to Rule 4(c),
including a United States marshall or his deputy, by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee. Service
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be the basis for an entry of a default or a
judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant. If delivery of the process is refused, the person serving
the process, promptly upon the receipt of notice of such refusal, shall mail to
the defendant by first class mail a copy of the summons and complaint and a
notice that despite such refusal the case will proceed and that judgment by
default will be rendered against him unless he appears to defend the suit. Any
such default or judgment by default shall be set aside pursuant to Rule 55(c)
or Rule 60(b) if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the return receipt was signed or delivery was refused by an unauthorized person.
2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, 1 4.01[33.-2].
27. RULE 4(d)(8), SCRCP.
28. RULE 5(b)(1), SCRCP (emphasis added).
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of the state rules to establish clearly that the date of receipt is
the starting date for calculating the time to respond to a summons and complaint served by mail.
Since a defendant is given the full thirty days allotted by
rule 12(a) to answer, 9 there is no justification for granting an
additional five days to respond merely because the process was
received through the mail rather than by personal delivery. In
addition, federal rule 6(e) has always been read in conjunction
with rule 5(b) to compensate for the time the "notices or papers" were in the mail. The specific exclusion of the summons
and complaint, found in the last sentence of rule 5(b), strongly
suggests that there was never any intention that rule 6(e) should
apply to service of the summons and complaint. Thus, the structure of the state rules, and particularly the changes made from
the federal model, support the conclusion that rule 6(e) has
nothing to do with the calculation of the time to respond to a
summons and complaint served by mail.
2. When Service on a Statutory Agent Allows Additional
Time to Respond
The second question created by rule 6(e) is whether the additional time to respond applies to all service made on statutory
agents or only to service made by mail. As noted above, neither
the 1958 Judicial Council draft nor the 1985 rules are of any
help in interpreting the rule's language.3 0 To the extent that an
inference can be drawn from the language of the rule,3 1 the use
of the disjunctive "or" suggests that the rule applies in both situations. It is perhaps more persuasive that the relevant language
first appeared in the 1958 Judicial Council draft only two years
after the decision in Ward v. Miller,3 2 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the "double time" provision for
service by mail did not apply when service was made upon an
official designated by statute to receive service of summons. Several code sections designate various officials as agents to receive

29. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) provides for only 20 days to answer after service of the
summons and complaint.
30. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
31. For text of rule 6(e), see supra text accompanying note 1.
32. 230 S.C. 288, 95 S.E.2d 482 (1956). See supra note 15.
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the summons and complaint,33 and this service is effective upon
delivery to the official who is required to mail the process to the
defendant.
Although the official is served by personal delivery, the actual litigant receives notification by mail. The time to answer or
otherwise plead runs while the summons is in the mail. This
method of service, combined with only a twenty-day period to
respond 34 and the courts' reluctance to open default judgments, 35 often caused litigation to terminate without ever reaching the merits. In this context, reading the language as adding
an additional three days or five days3" would reasonably compensate for the loss of time between receipt by the statutory
agent and actual receipt by the defendant.
Finally, the alternative reading of the rule-that the extension of time applies only when the summons and complaint is
served by mail-does not make sense in light of the conditions
prevailing in 1958, when the language of the rule was first
drafted. Service on a statutory agent was effective then only if
made by delivery to the designated agent; the agent could then
use the mail to notify the defendant.37 Thus, service on a statutory agent was not technically service by mail. Actual service by
mail was not authorized until the 1985 rules. To read rule 6(e) as
applicable only in cases of service by mail on statutory agents,
when no such service was permitted at the time of the rule's
drafting, would render the language meaningless. For these reasons, rule 6(e) should be read to add an additional five days
38
whenever a statutory agent is served by either method.

33. See, e.g., S.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 15-9-240 (Supp. 1984)(Secretary of State agent for

nonresident corporations not licensed to do business in state); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-270

(Supp. 1984)(Chief Insurance Commissioner agent for insurance companies); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-9-350 (1976)(Chief Highway Commissioner agent for nonresident motorists).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-310 (1976)(repealed 1985). In 1982 the South Carolina

Supreme Court, citing its inherent rulemaking power, changed to 30 days the time allotted to answer or otherwise plead. RULE 12(a), SCRCP provides for the same 30 days.
35. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 398-404
(1985).
36. The additional period is five days under RULE 6(e), SCRCP, but was three days
in the 1958 draft.
37. See statutes cited supra note 33.
38. RULE 6(e), SCRCP does not define a "statutory agent," but in light of the remedial purposes of the rule, it should include any agent whose authority to accept service is
required by statute, whether the defendant actually knows and designates the agent
under S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-40 (1976) or the agent is personally unknown to the defen-
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3. Computation of the Time for Response
One final issue raised by rule 6(e) concerns the method of
computing the total time available for response under rule 6(a).
Rule 6(a) provides:
Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed
or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the
designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or a State or Federal holiday, in
which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor such holiday. When
the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall be
excluded in the computation. A half holiday shall be considered as other days and not as a holiday.39
Under one view, the additional five days would be added to the
originally authorized time and the resulting period treated as
one unit for purposes of rule 6(a). Alternatively, the original
time and the additional five days could be treated as separate
periods under that rule. If the second method is used, the time
might be substantially extended.
For example, assume that the thirty days to answer interrogatories served by mail expires on Friday, July 4. Under the
first method, the periods are added together to produce a total
of thirty-five days, which expires the following Wednesday, July
9. Under the second method, the thirtieth day falls on a holiday
and rule 6(a) extends the time to the next day that is not a holiday, Saturday, or Sunday; thus, the original time expires on
Monday, July 7. If the time under 6(e) is added at that point,
the time to respond is extended to July 12, a Saturday, and extended again by rule to Monday, July 14.
A similar problem occurs under rule 6(a) if the time allowed
is less than seven days. This situation should not occur routinely
because rule 6(d) requires ten days notice of a motion. 40 If, howdant and appointed solely by law, as under S.C. CoD ANN. § 15-9-350 (1976) (nonresident
motorists).
39. RuLE 6(a), SCRCP.
40. See also RULE 30(b)(1), SCRCP (10 day notice of deposition), RuLE 56(c),
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ever, a court ordered a shorter period, rule 6(a) would exclude
intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and the same issue would arise. If, for example, on July 1 the court orders a
response within five days and the order is served by mail, then,
if the original five days and the rule 6(e) five days are treated as
separate periods, fifteen days are given for the response because
one holiday and two weekends are not counted. On the other
hand, if one ten-day period is authorized, the time expires on
July 10 because no holiday or intervening weekend is counted.
While federal precedents can be found to support both interpretations, the commentators, as well as prudence, suggest that the
first approach, producing one combined time period measured
from the date of mailing, is the preferred construction. As a
practical matter, however, it is better to assume that the time
set by the court is a fixed period and the intervening weekend
and holiday are not counted.
B. Service of "Process" Under Rule 4(c)
Rule 4(c) states:
By whom served. Service of summons may be made by a
sheriff, his deputy, or by any other person over eighteen (18)
years of age, not an attorney in or a party to the action. Service
of all other process shall be made by the sheriff or his deputy,
except that a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 45."1
This section is an amalgam of the provisions of the 1958 Judicial
Council draft, the existing federal rule, and the prior South Carolina Code.' 2 Despite the statement in the note accompanying
rule 4(c) that the new rule "continues present state practice,"' 3
it does introduce some changes.
1. Service of Summons and Complaint
Like the Judicial Council draft, this version prohibits the
parties' attorneys from serving the summons and complaint.
Neither the earlier draft nor the notes to the new rules provide
SCRCP (10 day notice for summary judgment).
41. RULE 4(c), SCRCP.

42. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-40 (1976)(repealed 1985).
43. RULE 4(c), SCRCP.
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any explanation for this change. The change appears to have
been made to avoid the possibility that an attorney be required
to recuse himself if called upon to testify when the validity of
service is challenged." Although this problem may have arisen
only infrequently under prior practice, the new rule eliminates it
entirely. Since the rule allows service by any nonparty over
eighteen years of age, no hardship in completing service should
result. Interestingly, parties who are forbidden by rule 4(c) from
serving the summons and complaint by other means of service
may do so by mail under rule 4(d)(8), which specifically permits
plaintiffs to serve a summons and complaint by registered mail.
The first sentence of rule 4(c) deletes a phrase found in the
prior statute allowing service "by the sheriff of the county in
which the defendant may be found .. . . ,,4This change suggests that a sheriff may serve a summons and complaint in a
county other than the one where he holds office. Normally, however, service in other counties may be made more easily by
civilians.
2. Service of Subpoenas
The service of subpoenas under rule 45(c) differs somewhat
from the summons and complaint service set out in rule 4(c).
Rule 45(c) provides that "[a] subpoena may be served by the
sheriff of any county in which the witness may be found, by his
deputy or by any other person who is not a party and is not less
than 18 years of age."'46 Thus, a subpoena, unlike a summons
and complaint, may be served by a party's lawyer or by an eighteen-year-old. 47 In addition, the inclusion of the qualifying language "sheriff of any county in which the witness may be found"
suggests a geographical limitation on the power of sheriffs to
serve subpoenas. Finally, the last sentence of rule 45(c) specifically permits service of subpeonas on Sunday, in contrast to sec-

44. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-101, -102.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-40 (1976)(repealed 1985)(emphasis added). The Judicial
Council draft was similar and stated "by the sheriff of any county in which the defendant may be found ....
" RuLE 4(c), SCRCP (Jud. Council Draft 1958)(emphasis
added).
46. RULE 45(c), SCRCP.
47. Under RULE 4(c), SCRCP, the server of a summons must be over 18 years of age.
For text of the rule, see supra text accompanying note 41.
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tion 15-9-1010 of the South Carolina Code,48 which authorized
Sunday service only for attachments.
3. Service of "Other Process"
The second sentence of rule 4(c) is more troublesome because it requires the sheriff to serve all "other process" without
providing any definition of the term "process." Moreover, the
advisory committee note states that rules and orders must be
served by the sheriff, which imposes a much greater burden on
sheriffs than under prior practice.
The term "process" is very broad. In Royal Exchange Assurance v. Bennettsville & Cheraw Railroad,49 the South Carolina Supreme Court, after reviewing the definitions offered by
various treatises, concluded:
In its general acceptation [process] means a writ, a summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the hearing of
the cause to a final determination, or to enforce the judgment
of the Court. A complaint is a mere pleading and does not partake of these characteristics."
Professor Moore defined "process" as "a judicial document, such
as a summons, notice, writ, or order, by means of which a court
exercises its jurisdiction over a party or property." 51 Certain
documents clearly constitute process because they are critical to
obtaining jurisdiction over a person or property. These include
the summons (to which the complaint must be attached), subpoenas, attachments, seizures in claim and delivery actions, arrests, and executions. None of these "processes" creates a problem under rule 4(c) because it is clear that summonses and
subpoenas may be served freely and that statutes compel the
sheriff to serve the other documents. 2
The real question is whether such documents as temporary

48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-1010 (1976)(repealed 1985).
49. 95 S.C. 375, 79 S.E. 104 (1913).
50. Id. at 379, 79 S.E.2d at 105.
51. 2 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 6, %4.02[1].
52. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-17-70 (1976)(arrest and bail in civil actions), 15-19-230
(1976)(attachment), 15-39-80 (1976)(executions and judicial sales), 15-69-50 to -60
(1976)(seizure in claim and delivery actions).
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restraining orders, injunctions, and the more routine orders in
litigation must be served by the sheriff. As suggested by the
note, orders fall within the definition of "process" because they
expedite the case and assist the court in its exercise of jurisdiction over persons and property. Yet, as the court in Royal Exchange Assurance noted, "The word 'process' has been variously
defined, for reasons that the context generally plays an important part in its construction.""3 The context, or reason for requiring service by an official, throws some light on what constitutes "process" within the meaning of rule 4(c). Although no
guidance is furnished by the notes to these rules or to the Judicial Council draft, the advisory committee notes to a similar provision, now found in federal rule 4(c)(1), provide some help.
These notes state that "forms of process which require an enforcement presence, such as temporary restraining orders, injunctions, attachments, arrests, and orders relating to judicial
sales shall be served by marshals, their deputies, and persons
specially appointed by the court.""
The primary policy underlying service by an enforcement
officer is the desire that an official represent the courts in obtaining custody and disposing of the person or property. This
policy is reflected in statutes that prescribe the procedure and
conduct to be followed by the sheriff in executing orders. A secondary justification is the need for an official presence to insure
compliance with the order and to avoid conflict between the
litigants.
The argument for an enforcement presence does not apply
to routine orders in civil litigation. These civil orders do not require an official presence for taking custody of or disposing of
property. Similarly, this type of order does not engender the resistance that requires a peace officer. Finally, counsel would normally have notice of civil orders through presence at court, service by opposing counsel under rule 5, or notice from the clerk

53. 95 S.C. at 379, 79 S.E. at 105.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee note (Proposed Amends. 1981). The United
States Supreme Court submitted to Congress several proposed amendments to federal
rule 4, including provisions for service of summons and complaint by mail. Congress rejected these amendments and enacted its own legislation, which achieved the objective of
the court's proposed amendments. The provision on service of process, now found in
federal rule 4(c)(1), was enacted as proposed. See generally 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTiCE, supra note 6, 4.01133].

Published by Scholar Commons, 1986

15

280

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3

under rule 77(d). Thus, it is unnecessary to use the sheriff to
insure actual notice.
The enforcement rationale suggests that restraining orders,
including the temporary restraining order (TRO), are different
from other forms of process and do not require service by the
sheriff. Further, no clear authority restricts service of the TRO
to the sheriff.55 In fact, prior practice sanctioned the use of private process servers, particularly where speed was necessary.
The TRO is analytically different from other types of process. While the summons (with the complaint attached) is the
essential process for acquiring jurisdiction over the person, the
TRO is an exercise of jurisdiction already acquired. The TRO
does not require the same functions of custody and disposal as
attachments and executions. Thus, the TRO seems more like a
routine order.
There are also two practical reasons for concluding that official service of a TRO should not be required. First, the TRO is
an ex parte ancillary remedy designed to preserve the status
quo. Under the new rules, the action is not commenced by "a
rule to show cause," but by service of the summons and complaint.5" Normally, then, the TRO would be served either with
or after the summons and complaint. Since original process can
be served by anyone who is not an attorney or party to the action, no rule prevents the TRO from being served by an authorized person at the same time. Second, once jurisdiction has been
acquired, service of a TRO is not essential to bind a person; actual notice of the order is sufficient. 57 It follows that the recipient of a summons and complaint with a TRO attached would
have actual notice and be bound regardless of whether or not the
rule technically requires that a sheriff make service. If so, requiring service by a sheriff seems a useless formality. The same argument applies to a temporary injunction: because it is issued only
after notice and a hearing, the restrained party or his representative would necessarily have actual notice of the order.

55. The notes to these rules and also to the Judicial Council draft refer to S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-9-1020 (1976)(repealed 1985) and imply that sheriffs must serve all process.
That section, however, prohibits the taxation of costs for service of process not made by
the sheriff in the county where it was served.
56. RULE 65(b), SCRCP & advisory committee note.
57. See RULE 65(d), SCRCP.
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This analysis suggests that nothing inherent in a TRO requires service by the sheriff. No statutory duties or obligations
are attached to the TRO. Certainly, the court has the power to
order service by the sheriff in appropriate situations. 8 In light of
prior practice, which did not require a sheriff's service, there is
little reason to demand this procedure under the new rules.
As this article was being prepared, the supreme court submitted proposed amendments to the general assembly. If not
disapproved by a three-fifths vote of each house, the second sentence of rule 4(c) will be amended to read:
Service of all other process shall be made by the sheriff or his
deputy, or any other duly constituted law enforcement official
or by any person designated by the court who is not less than
eighteen (18) years of age and not an attorney in or a party to
the action ....
This new language should resolve the problems inherent in the
original language of the rule.
C. Discovery Issues
1.

The Amount in Controversy

The new rules retain certain monetary limitations on the
use of discovery methods. Depositions are available only in cases
exceeding $10,000.51 The same is true of general interrogatories,
although a proposed amendment would raise the figure to
$25,000. Videotaped depositions and medical examinations are
obtainable only in cases over $100,000.
Consequently, the
prayer for relief will normally determine the discovery available
as a matter of right.
Rule 8(a)(3) permits pleading of actual damages in a sum
certain or in a general prayer, but requires that punitive dam1
ages be pled "in general terms only and not for a stated sum.
58. Cf. RULE 4(e), SCRCP (allowing service on a party not residing in or found in
state under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by statute, rule, or order).
59. RULES 30(a)(2), 33(b)(8), SCRCP.
60. RuLEs 30(h)(1), 35(a), SCRCP.
61. RULE 8(a)(3), SCRCP. A proposed amendment would add to rule 8(a) the following language: "provided, however, a party may plead that the total amount in controversy shall not exceed a stated sum which shall limit the claim for all purposes." This
change, if adopted, will permit a plaintiff to plead, for example, that actual and punitive
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Thus, when no specific sum is set forth, the defendant has the
task of determining what discovery is available. The easiest
means of accomplishing this is to serve the plaintiff with a discovery request. The plaintiff will then be forced either to comply
with the request or to move for a protective order on the ground
that the limited amount in controversy precludes availability of
the particular discovery sought. In either event, a record on the
critical issue will be made. Alternatively, the defendant could
use a simple interrogatory or request to admit, but these devices
are generally time-consuming. Finally, the defendant could arrange an informal agreement with opposing counsel, but some
written confirmation of the agreement must be preserved if it is
to be binding on the parties.6 2
It is not clear whether claims for punitive damages may be
considered in determining the amount in controversy. Initially,
it would appear that they may not. Since only actual damages
are pled in specific figures, there is no basis for assigning a value
to the punitive damage claim at the discovery stage.6" Careful
examination of the language of the rules, however, reveals that
they do not preclude consideration of the punitive damage
claim. The rules limiting use of the various discovery methods to
cases seeking a specific dollar amount speak, alternatively, of either the "amount in controversy" or the "prayer for relief.""
This suggests that the total claim may be considered to determine the discovery methods available. As a practical matter, the
issue may not present any real problem since all discovery procedures except the medical examination can be ordered by the
court upon a showing of good cause.6 5 Thus, in ambiguous cases
the court can allow the amount and types of discovery it deems
appropriate.
A related problem can arise when the jury returns a verdict
exceeding the stated amount in controversy. If discovery was redamages shall not exceed $9,999, thus limiting discovery. The pleading would control the
final recovery.
62. RULE 43(k), SCRCP.
63. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 310-11.
64. RULE 30(a)(2), SCRCP (depositions upon oral examination), RULE 33(b)(8),
SCRCP (standard interrogatories), and RULE 35(a), SCRCP (physical and mental examinations) speak in terms of the "amount in controversy." RuLE 30(h)(1), SCRCP (videotaped depositions) refers to "the prayer for relief."
65. RULES 30(a)(2), 30(h)(1), 33(b), 35(a), SCRCP.
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stricted because .of the amount pled, should the recovery be limited to that amount? The simple answer-that the stated
amount in controversy governs, as in prior practice, 66 -is inconsistent with rule 54(c). This rule provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings.

'6 7

This language has been construed by

the federal courts to permit the entry of judgment for an
amount in excess of what was pled. 8
The methods available for establishing the amount in controversy are not settled. As noted above, rule 54(c) implies that
the pleadings are not binding on the amount recoverable. Answers to interrogatories or depositions are, likewise, not determinative, since they constitute mere evidence, which may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence. On the other hand, an
agreement between the parties may be a stipulation and, thus,
binding on them. The same result may be achieved through a
request to admit: since an admission is conclusive on an issue, it
may not be contested by the admitting party.
The time when the issue of the amount in controversy is
raised is important. If raised during the trial, the most closely
analogous cases-those on amendments during trial8 --suggest
that the court would not permit the new claims despite the liberal language of rule 15(b) on amendments. 0 On the other hand,

66. Gainey v. Gainey, 279 S.C. 68, 301 S.E.2d 763 (1983); Carolina Veneer & Lumber
Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 103, 24 S.E.2d 153 (1943); Cummings v.
Lawrence, 87 S.C. 457, 69 S.E. 1090 (1911). As in prior practice, a default judgment
cannot exceed the amount pled. Compare RULE 54(c), SCRCP with S.C. CODE ANN. § 1535-70 (1976)(repealed 1985). Under the proposed amendment to rule 8(a), if the pleading
specifically contained a "not to exceed" figure, that amount would control. See supra
note 61.
67. RuLE 54(c), SCRCP.
68. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &

M. KANE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

2664

(1983)(hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER).
69. See, e.g., Alamance Indus. v. Chesterfield Hosiery Mill, 239 S.C. 287, 122
S.E.2d 648 (1961). See also H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 288-89.
70. Rule 15 reads in part:
15(b). Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues.
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if it is difficult to establish that the denied discovery would have
benefited the party requesting it, then the principle of harmless
error7 1 argues for the change. If the issue is first raised after the
verdict has been rendered, the court has sufficient power to order a remittitur if the verdict is excessive,7 2 but not if the verdict is within the range of what the jury could reasonably have
found.
The current rules provide no clear solution to this problem,
and the proposed amendment to rule 8(a)7 3 is only a partial so-

lution. Yet so many tactical decisions are based on the amount
in controversy that resolution of the issue is important. To make
the amount pled nonbinding, except in cases of obvious abuse or
harm to the party seeking discovery, would encourage sharp
practice and lead to unnecessary litigation. The better course,
therefore, is for counsel to insure that the respective parties
treat the stated amount as binding for all purposes and that the
court respect and enforce that decision. If the evidence adduced
at trial would support a greater recovery than pled, the pleadings should be so amended pursuant to rule 15(b).
2. The Summary of Knowledge Required by Rule 33(b)(7)
The major change in the standard interrogatories, which are
available in every case, is found in rule 33(b)(7), which states:
For each person known to the parties or counsel to be a
witness concerning the facts of the case, set forth either a summary sufficient to inform the other party of the important facts
known to or observed by such witness, or provide a copy of7any
4
written or recorded statements taken from such witnesses.
The purpose of this rule is to help identify critical fact witnesses
and to focus discovery efforts with a minimum of time and effort. This provision furnishes a means of identifying the most
knowledgeable witnesses and, thus, leads to a more timely and
economical resolution of the case.
Rule 33(b)(7) appears to apply only to fact witnesses, not to
RULE 15(b), SCRCP.
71. RULE 61, SCRCP.

72. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 385.
73. For text of amendment, see supra note 61.
74. RULE 33(b)(7), SCRCP.
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experts. These two classes of witnesses are frequently distinguished under the rules. They are subject to different standard
interrogatories.75 The language of rule 33(b)(7) specifically refers
to a "witness concerning the facts of the case," the same designation used in rule 33(b)(1) to identify fact witnesses. In addition, rule 26(b)(4) explicitly treats the subject of expert witnesses and provides that they be subject to deposition in this
state. The drafters specifically rejected the federal model, 6
which calls for an initial interrogatory followed by additional
discovery if necessary. In practice depositions are almost always
taken because interrogatories directed to an expert are not particularly useful.
Rule 33(b)(7) calls for a "summary sufficient to inform the
other party of the important facts known to or observed by such
witness[es] . . . ."" The advisory note provides the only guidance on the amount of detail required: "The rule requires a detailed summary so as to avoid the problem encountered with the
interrogatories directed to experts in Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
which often results in a short, vague summary of expected testimony. 17 8 Those summaries have tended to be conclusory and insufficiently informative.1 9
The phrase "facts known to or observed by such witness"

75. RuLE 33(b)(6), SCRCP, states: "List the names and addresses of any expert witnesses whom the party proposes to use as a witness at the trial of the case."
76. The federal rule provides:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
77. RULE 33(b)(7), SCRCP.
78. RULE 33(b), SCRCP advisory committee note.
79. For example, in Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the response
was that
[the expert] would testify on the question of whether plaintiff was treated in
accordance with good, sound medical practice; that as to plaintiff's condition
...
any residual complaint would be more annoying than anything else; that
there is no functional disability; that the care and treatment by Dr. Resnick
was in accordance with good, sound medical practice.
Id. at 511. See generally Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 92930 (1976).
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suggests that only direct evidence is sought. In addition, the interrogatory calls for "important" facts in summary form, implying that information is required only on the critical and relevant
issues in the case. Significantly, the response does not hinge on
the form of the interrogatory used. The responding party cannot
hide any witness or testimony of a witness, and all important
facts must be reported.
This rule gives the responding party the option of providing
either a summary or a record of the witness' statement. The information provided will be the same regardless of the chosen
method of compliance. The second sentence of rule 33(b) states
that interrogatories are deemed to be continuing; thus information that comes to the attention of the party or counsel after the
original answers to interrogatories "shall be promptly transmitted to the other party."80 As a result, if an initial statement does
not contain an important fact, it must be supplemented when
the information becomes known to the party or counsel.
The final issue raised by the rule is how it is to be enforced
when a party seeks to introduce testimony of an "important
fact" not previously disclosed. The court clearly has inherent
power to exclude the proffered testimony, 81 but the existence of
the power does not mean that it must be exercised in every
case. 2 In the analogous situation when parties have failed to
identify witnesses, the federal courts have considered the parties' explanation for the omission, the nature of the testimony,
the prejudice to the opposing party, the need for a continuance,
and other relevant factors before deciding whether to admit or
83
exclude the testimony.

State precedents reflect a similar procedure. Witnesses have
been excluded when there was a deliberate refusal to supply the
requested information.8 4 On the other hand, courts have sometimes permitted testimony when the opposing party knew of the
witnesses' existence. It is significant, however, that these prior
decisions permitted or excluded the witness' entire testimony.8 5
80. RuLE 33(b), SCRCP.
81. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 2050.
82. Id. See also Laney v. Hefley, 262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 12 (1974).
83. 11 WRIGHT & MMLLER, supra note 68, § 2950.
84. Morgan v. Carolina Door Prods., Inc., 281 S.C. 423, 315 S.E.2d 119 (1984); Moran v. Jones, 281 S.C. 270, 315 S.E.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1984).
85. Kirkland v. Peoples Gas Co., 269 S.C. 431, 237 S.E.2d 772 (1977); Martin v.
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The question raised by rule 33(b)(7) is whether the witness can
testify to specific facts not previously disclosed. Because the
stakes are smaller, the court can afford to enforce the provisions
of rule 33(b)(7) more strictly, particularly when the failure to
disclose provides a party with a tactical advantage.
3. Medical and Physical Examinations
Rule 35(a) authorizes, for the first time, mental and physical
examinations of a party or a person in the custody and control
of another party. The provisions of this rule differ from those
governing other discovery methods in at least three respects.
First, the court's order for an examination may be issued upon
"good cause shown."88 Second, the rule does not permit the
court to waive the amount in controversy.17 Finally, the rule restricts the location of the examination, the persons who may attend, and the method by which it is to be conducted. These last
restrictions are unparalleled in the federal rule.
The provisions of the second paragraph of rule 35(a), governing the location, persons in attendance, and method, are the
most problematical. If the party to be examined requests, his
own physician must be permitted to attend the examination. In
addition, the court must schedule the examination in the county
where either the person to be examined or his physician resides
and must give "special consideration" to their convenience.
This rule presents a number of problems for the examining
party. First, it entirely ignores the schedule of the examining
physician. Second, the express language that the examination
"must" take place in the county where the examined party or
his physician resides could prevent the physician from employing diagnostic machinery or techniques not available in the specified county. Parties who happen to live in counties with unsophisticated medical services would be able to prevent any useful
Dunlap, 266 S.C. 230, 222 S.E.2d 8 (1976). In Jackson v. H & S Oil Co., 263 S.C. 407, 211
S.E.2d 223 (1975), a divided court permitted an expert to testify although he was identified only at a late date and completed his examination two days before the trial. The
decision was questionable and has been criticized. See Practiceand Procedure,Annual
Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 28 S.C.L. REv. 369, 380-84 (1976).

86. RULE 35(a), SCRCP.
87. Compare RULE 35(a), SCRCP with RuLEs 30(a)(2), 30(h)(1), 33(b)(8), 36(c),
SCRCP.
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medical examination and thus frustrate the purpose of the rule.
This result is unintended and unjustified. Language in the
first paragraph of rule 35 clearly gives the court the authority to
"specify the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made
.".aUnfortunately, the opposition to medical exams when
they were proposed in 1958 and the express language cited above
argue against a flexible interpretation. Some relief may be found
in the court's equitable powers to order discovery in special proceedings8 or perhaps in its inherent authority to control its procedure and cases.90 Commentators, however, have questioned a
court's authority to rely on its inherent power when the rule itself imposes explicit limitations.9 1 The most desirable course
under the current rule is an agreement between the parties to
waive these limitations pursuant to rule 29.2 A proposed
amendment to the second paragraph of rule 35(a) would resolve
these problems by retaining the provisions on scheduling and location, but granting the court discretion to vary them in appropriate circumstances.9 3

88. RULE 35(a), SCRCP.
89. Ex parte Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 248 S.C. 412, 150 S.E.2d 525 (1966).
90. Some states have held that the court has the inherent power to order medical
examinations. See, e.g., G. S. Ry. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 8 So. 90 (1890). Before the federal
rules were passed, the United States Supreme Court rejected the inherent power theory.
See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). See also Witte v. Fullerton, 376
P.2d 244 (Okla. 1962); Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W.
1031 (1915).
91. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 2233.
92. Rule 29 provides:
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or
place, upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like
other depositions, and (2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for
other methods of discovery, except that stipulations extending the time provided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for responses to discovery may be made only with
the approval of the court.
RULE 29, SCRCP.
93. The proposed language reads:
The physician of the party to be examined may be present at the examination. Unless the parties agree, or the court for good cause shown determines
otherwise, the examination shall be in the county where the person to be examined, or his physician resides, and special consideration shall be given to the
convenience of the person to be examined and that of his physician in setting
the time and place of the examination, and reasonable consideration shall be
given to the convenience of the examining physician.
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A different problem is created by the last sentence of rule
35(a): "Upon objection to the physician designated to make the
examination, and if the parties shall fail to agree as to who shall
make the examination the court may designate a physician; but
the fact that a physician was so designated shall not be admissible upon the trial.

'9 4

The effect of this provision is ambiguous

because it does not specify what type of objection would trigger
the court's appointment power. One possible interpretation is
that the attorney for the examined party can object to the
choice of physician on any ground. This view would give the examined party and his attorney an effective veto over the requesting party's expert and, thus, a measure of control over the
presentation of the opposing party's case. Although it is generally held that there is no absolute right to have the examination
conducted by a particular person, courts often follow the suggestion of the requesting party.9 5 This is particularly true when the
examined party's objection goes to the weight of the testimony
rather than the qualifications of the physician or the conduct of
the examination. The proposed amendment to rule 35(a) requiring that the objection be "reasonable" 97 supports the view

that the objection must be directed to the abilities of the examining physician or to the contemplated tests.
III. THE RULES AND THE INFERIOR COURTS
A.

The Masters

Rule 53 governs the reference of issues to a master, referee,

auditor, or examiner. In general, the circuit court, either in its
discretion or by the parties' consent, can refer matters to a
master for the taking of evidence or the determination of issues.
References usually occur in nonjury cases, but can also be made
in complex jury cases, subject to some restrictions discussed
below.9

The order of reference determines the master's authority to
94. RuLE 35(a), SCRCP.
95. 8 WRIGHT & MELER, supra note 68, § 2234.
96. See, e.g., Postell v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 706 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
97. For text of the proposed amendment, see supra note 93.

98. See infra text accompaning notes 111-14.
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decide the issues referred. This order may permit the master to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are subject to
review and modification by the circuit judge; or the order may
state that pursuant to rule 53(e)(4) the parties have stipulated
that the master's findings of fact are final and the court may
decide only questions of law.99 The order may also permit the
master to direct the entry of judgment based upon his findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The procedure for taking exceptions to the master's report and appealing any decision based on
the report is determined by the extent of the authority delegated to the master. Each of these options will be considered
separately.
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Nonjury
Trials
Assuming that the master is limited to making either findings of fact only or both findings of fact and conclusions of law,
rule 53(e)(1) requires the master to prepare and file with the
clerk a report on the matters submitted. The form of the report
is within the discretion of the master, but rule 52(a) suggests
that the master should draw separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 00 Under rule 53(e)(5), the master can request
draft reports from counsel or submit draft reports to counsel for
comment. Unless otherwise stated in the order of reference, the
completed report must include the proceeding's transcript, evidence, and original exhibits. If required by the order, the report
may include findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recom0
mended judgment. 11
The clerk is required to notify all parties by mail when the
report has been filed, 10 2 unless the master has already notified

99. RULE 53(e)(4), SCRCP, provides in part: "[W]hen the parties stipulate that a
master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall
thereafter be considered."
100. This rule provides in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon .... The findings of a master, to the extent that a court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court.
RULE 52(a), SCRCP.
101. RULE 53(e)(1), SCRCP.
102. Cf. Rule 77(d)(requiring the clerk to notify the parties of an entry of order or
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them in writing. Thereafter, counsel has ten days to "serve notice of intention to take exceptions" to the master's report. 10 3
After serving the notice of intention to fie exceptions, counsel
has an additional thirty days to serve the exceptions or have
them deemed abandoned. 0 Rule 5(d) requires the notice and
exceptions to be filed with the court.
The master's report does not become effective automatically. Although the clerk may be expected to schedule a hearing
on the exceptions on the nonjury calender, counsel must be
aware that rule 53(e)(2) requires both a motion under rule 6(d)
for action upon the report or upon the exceptions and a hearing
by the court on the report. 10 5 In the absence of an exception, the
report becomes the law of the case.106 Under rule 53(e)(2), the
court has authority to adopt, modify, or 'reject the report in
whole or in part, to take additional evidence, or to recommit it
with additional instructions. Further authority for this extensive

review is found in Code section

14-11_90,107

which makes orders

of the master "subject to the revision of the presiding judge at
the next succeeding sitting of the court. . . ."08 Unlike its federal counterpart, rule 53 does not require that the master's findings be accepted unless clearly erroneous.10 9
Once the circuit judge has reviewed the master's report and
either accepted or rejected its conclusions, the judge enters the
appropriate judgment pursuant to rule 58, and the matter proceeds as in any other civil action in circuit court. Counsel has
ten days from the entry of the judgment to file motions attacking the judgment. 110 Until resolved, these motions stay the time
for appeal. Once a final order has been entered, counsel has ten
days from the receipt of notice of the filing of the judgment to
file and serve notice of intention to appeal, and that procedure
follows the normal course of an appeal.

judgment).

103. RULE 53(e)(2), SCRCP.
104. Id.
105. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 68, § 2612.
106. Welborn v. Page, 247 S.C. 554, 148 S.E.2d 375 (1966).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-90 (Supp. 1984).
108. Id.
109. Compare RULE 53(e)(2), SCRCP with FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
110. See RULES 52, 59, SCRCP.
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2. Reference in Jury Cases
References are permissible in jury cases, but can be expensive and dilatory. Further, findings of the master are only evidentiary and not conclusive. Consequently, rule 53(b) limits references to those jury cases in which the issues are complicated.
Reference in a jury case does not violate the right to jury trial
because the jury may accept or reject the findings.1 11
Although not explicitly stated in the rule, the parties apparently must consent to a reference in a jury case. The first sentence of rule 53(b) makes the court's ability to order a reference
discretionary, even if the parties consent, and permits the clerk
to order a reference in a default case. The second sentence addresses references in jury cases and sets forth the complexity requirement and the limitations on and effect of the master's findings. 112 The third sentence states that "[i]n all other actions the
court may upon application of any party or upon its own motion
direct a reference of all or any of the issues, whether of fact or
law."1 1 3 The juxtaposition of the last two sentences and the introductory phrase "in all other actions" suggest that a reference
cannot be made in a jury case solely upon the application of a
party or a motion of the court. 114 Once the master's conclusions
are presented to the jury, the case and appeal, including the
post-trial motions, proceed as in ordinary jury cases.

111. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1920); 5A MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 6, 153.14[3].
112. This sentence reads: "In actions to be tried before a jury, a reference shall be

made only when the issues are complicated, and the findings of the master as to matters
of fact shall be received as evidence only, in accordance with these rules." RULE 53(b),
SCRCP.
113. Id.
114. Two other provisions deserve mention. RULE 53(e)(3), SCRCP covers the manner in which the master's conclusions are conveyed to the jury and expressly directs the
master not to report the evidence underlying these conclusions. The master's testimony
has been likened to that of an expert witness. 5A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
6, 15 3.14[4]. RULE 53(e)(4), SCRCP states that the effect of the master's report is the
same whether or not the parties consented to the reference. This language is taken from
the comparable federal rule, where it was included to overrule early federal case law
holding that the findings were entitled to greater weight when the reference was by consent. Id. 1 53.15. As an evidentiary provision, it has no bearing on the question of consent
to a reference.
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3. Binding Effect of Master's Conclusions
Rule 53(e)(1) states that "if the parties consent in writing or
the order of reference so provides, [the master] shall direct entry
11 5
of judgment in the action without further order of court.M
Thus, after the filing of the report, the master could direct the
clerk to enter judgment pursuant to rule 58. The final sentence
of rule 53(e)(2) provides that the entry of judgment triggers the
post-trial appeal rights of the parties: "In actions where judgment is entered on the master's report, the provisions of Rules
50, 52, 59, and 60 shall apply as in actions tried by the court
without a jury; and right of appeal from the judgment shall lie
as from a judgment of the court." 118
Rule 53 does not explicitly state whether the post-trial motions are to be heard by the master or the circuit judge. Since
the post-trial motions generally address legal issues, perhaps
these motions should be submitted to the court; on the other
hand, if the judge hears the motions, the process will become
more complex, a result that the parties and the court intended
to avoid when they agreed to make the master's findings conclusive. Moreover, the master is more knowledgeable about the individual case. If the circuit judge is required to familiarize himself with the record and contentions of the parties, further delay
would inevitably ensue. The last sentence of Code section 14-1190117 suggests another argument that the master should hear the
post-trial motions. This section provides: "Appeals from final
judgment entered by a master pursuant to § 15-31-10 [repealed
May 21, 1985] shall be to the circuit court unless otherwise directed by order of the circuit court or by consent of the parties." 1 8 This language reinforces the intent of rule 53(e)(2) that
when judgment is entered directly on the master's report, review
by the circuit court is not required; consequently, post-trial motions should be heard and decided by the master who directed
the entry of judgment.

115. RuLE 53(e)(1), SCRCP. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-90 (Supp. 1984),
which provides in part: "Final orders based on reports of masters shall be executed by
circuit judges except where the master enters final judgment pursuant to provisions of §
15-31-10 [repealed 1985]."
116. RuLE 53(e)(2), SCRCP.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-90 (Supp. 1984).
118. Id.
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If the master is authorized to enter a final judgment, he
may do so in either of two situations: if no post-trial motions
have been made or if the motions made have been resolved. If
post-trial motions have been entered, the time for appeal is
stayed pending their resolution.'19 The time for filing the notice
of intention to appeal commences only upon receipt of notice of
the final judgment. Unless further steps are taken, the final
judgment entered by the master would be appealed to the circuit court pursuant to section 14-11-90.120

Under rule 53(e)(2) and section 14-11-90, as well as former
section 15-31_10,121 review by the circuit court can be avoided if

the parties explicitly agree that the master's decision will be appealable directly to the supreme court. Either the reference order or the parties' agreement must provide, in writing,'22 for the
entry of a final judgment by the master and for a direct appeal.
In addition to saving time, direct appeal has the advantage of
increasing the available scope of review because the "two judge
rule" does not apply and the appellate court is, therefore, free to
render a decision based on its view of the preponderance of the
23
evidence.1

This discussion has so far addressed the powers of the
master. The first sentence of rule 53, however, states that the
term "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner.
This language may overrule the recent decision in Luck v. Pencar, Ltd., 24 in which the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that the specific language of section 14-11-90 authorized a direct
appeal only from the decision of a master, not from the decision
of a referee, 25 even if the parties agree to the entry of a final
119. See RULES 50(e), 52(c), 59(0, SCRCP. See also supra text accompanying note
110.
120. If the order of reference authorizes the master to enter a final judgment without a written consent to a direct appeal, the statute requires that the appeal be to the
circuit court. Glass v. Glass, 278 S.C. 527, 299 S.E.2d 693 (1983). It is unclear how the
circuit court's review of the final order of the master would differ from review of a nonfinal master's report.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-31-10 (Supp. 1984)(repealed 1985).

122. Precision Power Co. v. Adams, 283 S.C. 553, 325 S.E.2d 59 (1983).
123. For an explanation of the "two-judge" rule, see infra text accompanying note
172.
124. 282 S.C. at 643, 320 S.E.2d 711 (Ct. App. 1984). For a discussion of Luck, see
Practice and Procedure,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 37 S.C.L. REV. 165, 18889 (1985).
125. 282 S.C. at 645, 320 S.E.2d at 712.
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judgment by the referee and a direct appeal. 126 If the rule 53
definition of "Master" is read in conjunction with the statute, it
may be inferred that the master's and referee's decisions should
be treated identically. This interpretation is certainly consistent
with the intent of both the rules and the statutory scheme. As
the court of appeals noted in Luck, 12 7 Code section 14-11-60128
provides that the special referee shall "be clothed with all the
powers of a master," 12 9 and section 15-31-150130 states that he
"shall have the same authority"1 3 1 as a master.
The proposed amendments to rule 53 make a number of minor changes to give the master greater discretion over the time
and location of hearings. Rule 53(e)(1) no longer requires filing
of the transcript if one has not been prepared, and rule 53(e)(2)
permits any party to obtain a transcript before a hearing on
exceptions.
B.

Application of the Rules to Inferior Courts

Determining the applicability of particular civil rules to inferior courts can be a complex process; in most cases, however,
application of the basic principles in rule 81 can furnish the appropriate solution. Rule 81 states:
These rules, or any of them, shall apply to every trial court
of civil jurisdiction within this state, within the limits of the
jurisdiction and powers of the court provided by law, and the
procedure therein shall conform to these rules insofar as practicable. They shall apply insofar as practicable in magistrate's
courts, probate courts, and family courts to the extent they are
not inconsistent with the statutes and rules governing those
courts. In any case where no provision is made by statute or
these Rules, the procedure shall be according to the practice as
132
it has heretofore existed in the courts of this State.

126. Id. at 644, 320 S.E.2d at 711. The court reasoned that the right of appeal is not
a power granted to a master, but rather a right conferred upon a party. This right, then,
could only be abrogated pursuant to a specified statutory provision. Id. at 645-46, 320
S.E.2d at 712.
127. Id. at 645, 320 S.E.2d at 712.
128. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 14-11-60 (Supp. 1984).
129. Id.
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-31-150 (Supp. 1984).
131. Id.
132. RULE 81, SCRCP.
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An examination of the probate court, which has limited jurisdiction and numerous applicable rules and statutes, will afford an
excellent illustration of the effect of rule 81.
1. Relationship Between the New Rules and Existing Rules
and Statutes Governing the Probate Courts
Stated affirmatively, the second sentence of rule 81 means
that the existing probate rules and statutes133 remain in effect
and take precedence over the circuit court rules. Although the
South Carolina Court Register contains rules for probate procedure, these relate only to administrative matters and, therefore,
13 4
have no effect on probate procedure.
Although there are no current rules of probate procedure affecting the operation of the circuit court rules, statutes that prescribe procedure for probate courts do override the new rules.
For example, section 18-5-20 of the South Carolina Code' 35 directs that notice of intention to appeal to the circuit court be
filed within fifteen days of judgment in the office of the probate
court. Rule 74, which covers some of the same procedures, requires that the notice of intention to appeal be served on the
other parties within ten days after receipt of the written notice
of the judgment and filed with the clerks of both the inferior
court and the court to which the appeal is taken. The specific
statute establishing procedure in the inferior courts supersedes
the provisions of the circuit court rule.
Practitioners must be familiar with both the new rules and
the probate court statutes because the circuit court rules govern

133. Two classes of statutes must be distinguished: those actually governing probate
court practice and those governing specific actions, but incidentally addressing court procedure. The former class comprises the "statutes" addressed by rule 81. The provisions
in the latter class are not "statutes. . . governing [probate] courts" and are subordinate
to the new rules. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
134. Rule 1 is untitled and concerns the reuse of tapes used to record proceedings in
the probate court. The titles of the remaining rules are descriptive: Duty of Probate
Judge (rule 2); Procedures to be Handled in ProcessingProbate Matters, Maintaining
Records, and Submitting Reports of the Court (rule 3); Proceduresfor Ending Defunct
Cases (rule 4). The Probate Court Practice Rules, first enacted in 1879 and republished
in the 1976 South Carolina Code, were repealed by implication in 1978 when the supreme court adopted the South Carolina Court Register, which did not include those
rules.
135. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-5-20 (1976).
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some matters not specifically provided for in the probate court
statutes. Several probate statutes, for example, require service of
the summons and complaint in the same manner as if in circuit
court. Thus, the new rules, including the new provision for service by mail of the summons and complaint in rule 4,136 govern
this procedure in probate courts. Other rules, such as rule 6, governing computation of time,13 7 control in probate litigation simply because no probate rule or statute specifically addresses that
subject.
In some cases, the new rules are more flexible than the statutes governing the inferior courts, but are not inconsistent with
them. For example, Code section 14-23-330138 authorizes the
probate judge to issue a commission to depose a person whose
testimony is needed in the case. This procedure is more cumbersome than the deposition procedure in rule 30, but since the rule
does not contradict the statute, probate judges are not bound to
follow the procedure in the statute. In the absence of conflict,
the court could and should authorize the more flexible procedure
permitted in the rules when it expedites the case, provided that
it is "practicable" and does not expand the jurisdiction of the
court.
2. Jurisdictionand "Practicability"Limitations on Applying
the New Rules to the Probate Court
The major problem facing both court and counsel is determining when a particular circuit court rule should not be applied in an inferior court. Rule 81 contains two general restrictions. The first limitation is that the circuit court rules apply to
a trial court only "within the limits of the jurisdiction and powers of the court provided by law."13 9 Thus, the powers of an inferior court cannot be expanded merely because a circuit court
rule authorizes a new procedure. For example, rule 18 authorizes
a plaintiff to join any claim he might have against any defendant, regardless of whether the various claims are factually or
legally related. This rule does not, however, authorize the pro-

136. See supra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 7-40 and accompanying text.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-330 (1976).
139. RULE 81, SCRCP.
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bate court to entertain claims that are beyond its probate
jurisdiction.
The second limitation is found in the first two sentences of
rule 81, which both provide that the circuit court rules apply in
the probate courts "insofar as practicable." This language confers on the judge the power to determine whether a new rule is
"practicable" in the individual case. The rule fails to provide
any definition of practicability, but the judge must certainly
consider such factors as the cost to litigants, delay in the basic
proceedings, prejudice to the parties, and the appropriateness of
the forum.
Among the major innovations introduced by the new rules
are the more liberal joinder and discovery procedures,14 ° which
have the potential, in some circumstances, to expedite cases and
reduce costs for the litigants. Rule 28, for example, now permits
a party, whether or not a case is pending, to employ depositions
to preserve testimony that otherwise might be lost through
death or disability. Yet the use of these depositions, as well as of
other discovery procedures such as discovery conferences and
general interrogatories, is inappropriate in many cases. The
practicability limitation in rule 81 permits an inferior court
judge to require justification before approving the use of any
procedure now authorized under the new rules. Consequently,
the judge can deny the use of discovery procedures if they are
too expensive, seem designed to harass, or unduly enlarge the
case. The judge's power to determine the rules' applicability is
necessary to prevent the use of rules designed for general litigation in courts of limited jurisdiction.
3. Effect of PriorPractice on Applying the New Rules
The last sentence of rule 81 states: "In any case where no
provision is made by statute or these Rules, the procedure shall
be according to the practice as it has heretofore existed in the
courts of this State.

14'

This rule applies to any situation not

140. Joinder of claims is virtually unlimited and joinder of parties is restricted only
by the requirement that at least one claim of each party arise out of the same transaction or occurrence asserted in the main action. The rules also authorize general interrogatories, depositions upon written questions, and medical examinations. See generally H.
LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 171-90, 297-341.
141. RuLE 81, SCRCP.
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covered by rule or statute, as well as situations when application
of the rules would be "impracticable" or would expand the jurisdiction of the probate court. For example, once a court has acquired jurisdiction of a person, prior practice indicates that a
rule to show cause may be the appropriate pleading to bring a
matter before the court, even though this pleading is not authorized by the new rules or by an existing rule or statute of the
inferior court.
4.

The New Rules and ProceduralProvisions Within
Existing Statutes

Problems also arise in attempting to reconcile procedural
provisions contained in specific statutes with the new rules.
Code section 15-19-210142 provides a useful example of the types
of problems that can arise and how they can be resolved. This
statute appears to permit the complaint to be served after the
summons in an attachment proceeding and requires the defendant to answer within twenty days. 43 This interpretation
presents two problems. First, the new rules make no provisions
for a summons served separately from a complaint. The repeal
of Code section 15-13-230,14 which provided that the complaint
did not need to be served with the summons, indicates that the
circuit court rules now govern this issue. Thus, under rule 4(d),
"The summons and complaint must be served together."1 45 The
second problem is the inconsistency between the statute and
rule 12(a). The statute requires an answer within twenty days of
service of the complaint, while rule 12(a) allows thirty days.
Since section 3 of the repealing statute, 1 46 as well as the South

142. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 15-19-210 (1976).

143. This statute provides in part:
Immediately upon issuance of the warrant . . . the sheriff or constable

shall execute such warrant and the plaintiff, if the defendant shall not have
been served with a copy of the complaint with the summons, shall within ten
days after being required so to do by the defendant serve a copy of the complaint in the action on the defendant or his attorney ....
The defendant shall
have twenty days thereafter to answer the complaint ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-19-210 (1976).
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-230 (1976)(repealed 1985).
145. RULE 4(d), SCRCP.
146. 1985 S.C. Acts 277, No. 100.
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Carolina Supreme Court's order promulgating the new rules, 14 7
provides that the new rules control any prior inconsistent statutes, rule 12(a) controls and a thirty-day period is allowed.
5. DistinguishingSubstance and Procedure in Applying the
New Rules
A final issue arises from the provision in the repealing statute that the new rules of procedure "may [not] be construed to
affect the substantive legal rights of any party to any civil litigation in the courts of this State but shall affect only matters of
practice and procedure. '148 The general proposition that procedure should not affect substantive rights is clear, and the new
rules are almost always procedural. The distinction between substance and procedure, however, is not always easily drawn.
One situation that illustrates both the difficulty and the effect of drawing this distinction arises in shareholder derivative
actions. The subject is addressed both in rule 23(b)(1) and in
Code section 33-11-290,149 which are generally coextensive. Rule
23(b)(1), however, states that the plaintiff must plead that an
attempt was made to obtain shareholder approval prior to filing
suit, while Code section 33-11-290 makes no mention of this requirement.1 6 0 The statute can be viewed as solely procedural because it applies only to suits brought in South Carolina, regardless of the state of incorporation, and does not affect litigation
5 If
involving South Carolina corportions in other jurisdictions.
Code section 33-11-290 is solely procedural, then rule 23 governs
because the new rule takes precedence over a prior procedural
statute. Alternatively, some jurisdictions have viewed the share152
holder demand as a requirement of substantive corporate law.
Although the demand is a pleading requirement, it can also be
considered a necessary element of the cause of action, the absence of which defeats recovery. If demand is viewed as a matter
of substantive corporate law, then Code section 33-11-290 gov-

147. Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court (April 10, 1985).
148. 1985 S.C. Acts 277, No. 100 § 3.
149. S.C. CODE ANN.

§

33-11-290 (Supp. 1984).

150. See also Adams, The 1981 Revision of the South CarolinaBusiness Corporation Act, 33 S.C.L. REv. 405, 406-10 (1982).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1980).
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erns and the procedural requirements of rule 23(b)(1) must
yield. Fortunately, neither this nor similar conflicts between the
new rules and substantive law are likely to arise very often; yet
this example illustrates the kinds of problems that may occur
under the new rules.
IV.

THE NEW RULES AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT

A.

The Time Within Which an Appeal Must Be Taken

The new rules on post-trial motions for directed verdict,
judgment non obstante veredicto (n.o.v.), and new trial all state
that "[t]he time for appeal for all parties shall run from the time
of entry of the order granting or denying such motion.

' 15 3

This

language suggests that the time for filing a notice of intention to
appeal may commence with the entry of judgmentM rather than
with the receipt of notice, as provided under supreme court rule
55 As a result, the new rules create an ambiguity in appellate
1.1
procedure that can lead to unfortunate consequences because
timely notice of the intent to appeal is necessary for appellate
jurisdiction. 156
A close reading of the relevant rules, however, reveals that
the ambiguity is more apparent than real. Broadly interpreted,
the rules can be read to mean that the time for appeal commences with the entry of judgment: The new rules do not define
the period during which an appeal must be taken; this subject is
addressed only by Supreme Court Rule 1, which requires that
the appellant file notice of intention to appeal within ten days
after the receipt of notice of the judgment or order or after the
rising of the lower court.1 57 Read together, the circuit court rules

and Supreme Court Rule 1 provide that the notice to appeal can
be filed no earlier than the entry of judgment and no later than
ten days after written notice of the relevant action or post-trial
153. RULES 50(e), 52(c), 59(f), SCRCP.
154. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
155. S.C. SuPR CT. R. 1.
156. See, e.g., First Carolina Nat'l Bank v. A & S Enters., 272 S.C. 339, 251 S.E.2d
762 (1979); Miller v. State, 269 S.C. 113, 236 S.E.2d 422 (1977).
157. S.C. SuPR. CT. R. 1 § 1 refers to the rising of the court, but RULE 6, SCRCP
eliminates the term of court as a reference point in computing time.
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motions.
Alternatively, if the new rules are read narrowly, they
merely preserve the traditional rule that the filing of a post-trial
motion destroys the finality of the judgment and stays the time
for all parties to appeal. This interpretation restricts applicability of the new rules to matters relevant to the circuit courts,
which do not include the time to appeal. This reading is consistent with the other provisions of the rules governing post-trial
motions, which are concerned only with the circuit 1court's
proce58
dure and jurisdiction to decide post-trial motions.

Whichever interpretation is chosen, the period of time
within which notice of intent to appeal must be filed is determined by statute and by the supreme court rules, not by the
new rules of civil procedure. This is the preferable approach because it prevents appellate procedure from being indirectly affected by the adoption of the rules and is consistent with rule
73, which states: "Procedure on appeal to the Supreme Court of
South Carolina shall be in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court. ' 159 This problem illustrates the need to coordinate
the civil and appellate rules. A committee has been formed to
revise the appellate rules and will, no doubt, address this problem and several others discussed in this section. In addition, the
proposed amendments to rules 50, 52, and 59 now make it clear
that the time to appeal commences upon receipt of written notice of the order on the post-trial motions.
B. Appealable Matters
Rule 72, dealing with judgments and orders subject to appeal, affects the procedure in the supreme court, as well as the
substance of the material that can be reviewed. The note to rule
72, following the notes to the 1958 Judicial Council draft, candidly states that the rule "is designed to reduce appeals from
interlocutory or intermediate orders in an action."1 60 The Judicial Council recognized that the rule affected the statute governing appellate jurisdiction in law cases,"6 ' but contemplated

158. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 377-409.
159. RULE 73, SCRCP.
160. RULE 72, SCRCP advisory committee note.
161. S.C. CO.DE ANN. § 14-3-330 (1976)(formerly § 15-123).
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that a revision of that statute would be submitted to the legislature along with the rules. 6 2 Since no revised statute was submitted, the adoption of rule 72 raises the possibility of conflict between the rule and the statute. The crucial question is whether
the supreme court intended to change its authority to review interlocutory orders when it adopted the new civil rules.
Much of rule 72 is consistent with the statute. The first sentence, sections (1) and (3), and the last paragraph of the rule
reflect exactly the comparable provisions in Code section 14-3330.163 Other portions, however, can be read to expand, reduce,
or stabilize appellate jurisdiction. For example, rule 72(4) authorizes, for the first time, an interlocutory appeal on issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The rule's second sentence
limits appeals to six types of interlocutory orders, fewer than the
interlocutory appeals "involving the merits" or "affecting a substantial right" authorized under prior law.16 4 Finally, rule 72(6)
permits an interlocutory appeal from any "other judgment or order appealable by statute,"'65 suggesting that the number of appealable interlocutory orders remains unchanged. This ambiguity again emphasizes the need to resolve the scope of the new
rules and their effect on appellate practice.
Certainly, the supreme court has the authority to affect appellate practice through the civil rules. The South Carolina Constitution166 authorizes the court to promulgate all rules of practice and procedure, provided that they are submitted to the
general assembly and not disapproved by three-fifths of each
house. Moreover, the order promulgating the rules and the repealing statute specifically provide that the rules control over
any remaining inconsistent statute.

67

Thus, the supreme court

could change its practice even though a statute on the subject

162. RuLE 72, SCRCP, notes 2, 4 (Jud. Council Draft 1958).

163. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 14-3-330 (1976).

164. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330(1), (2)(1976). Both of these tests are ambiguous,
but generally a matter "involves the merits" when it necessarily affects the judgment and
"affects a substantial right" when it effectively forecloses a party from contesting the
case on the merits. SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK V-5 to V-6 (1985).
165. RuLE 72(6), SCRCP.
166. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
167. See Order of Supreme Court (April 10, 1985)(promulgating the new rules to
become effective July 1, 1985); 1985 S.C. Acts 277, No. 100 § 3 (repealing statutes inconsistent with the new rules).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1986

39

SOUTH CAROLINA LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 37

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3

remained in the South Carolina Code.
It is inferable, however, that the supreme court did not intend to change its practice through these rules despite its power
to do so and the language of rule 72. The first sentence of rule
81 provides that the rules "apply to every trial court of civil jurisdiction within this state .

.

.""s Rule

82(a) states that these

rules do not "extend or limit the jurisdiction of any court of this
,,.In addition, rule 73 states that the procedure on
State . ."'
appeal shall be governed by the supreme court rules, rather than
the new rules, which are designated in rule 85(a) as the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The supreme court's appointment of a committee to consider revisions of the supreme court
rules suggests that the court carefully distinguishes between the
two sets of rules.
For these reasons, the better view is that the new civil rules
do not affect the appeal of interlocutory orders. This interpretation is certainly consistent with rule 72(6), which preserves existing statutory authorization for interlocutory appeals, but appears to conflict with rule 72(3), which seems to expand review.
A definite resolution must await either a specific appellate rule
or an opinion holding that jurisdictional issues "involve the merits" or "affect a substantial right."
C. The Scope of Review
Another problem is created by the third sentence of rule
52(a), which states: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.M70 This language should cause no problem when the

appellate court reviews findings of fact in law cases. Under
South Carolina case law, the lower court's findings will not be
disturbed unless no evidence exists that reasonably supports the
findings.171 Similarly, no problem arises when the findings of fact
made by a master or referee are confirmed by the circuit judge

168. RULE 81, SCRCP (emphasis added).
169. RuLE 82(a), SCRCP (emphasis added).
170. RULE 52(a), SCRCP.

171. Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86-87, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775
(1976).
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since under the well-established "two-judge" rule, the lower
court's findings will not be disturbed unless no evidence supports them. 1 2 Both these standards are equivalent to the
"clearly erroneous" standard in rule 52(a). 1 3
When, however, the circuit court fails to confirm the
master's or referee's finding, in an action in equity, a problem
does arise. Since the "two-judge" rule does not apply, the appellate court may find the facts according to its own views of the
preponderance of the evidence. 7 4 This standard is broader than
the "clearly erroneous" standard, and no amount of semantic
juggling can reconcile the language of rule 52 with prior practice.
Since there is substantial reason to believe that the supreme
17 5
court did not intend the civil rules to affect appellate practice,
rule 52 should not be read to affect the scope of review. In addition, the South Carolina Constitution specifically authorizes a
broad appellate review of findings of fact in equity cases.176
Thus, the narrower scope of review in rule 52 could be construed
as unconstitutional. For these reasons, the scope of review
should remain the same as under prior practice despite the language of rule 52. The proposed amendment to rule 52 deletes
this sentence and, if adopted, will completely resolve the
problem.

172. Id. at 86, 221 S.E.2d at 775-76.
173. The United States Supreme Court stated: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Other federal courts have
used tests that are similar to the "no reasonable evidence" standard used by the South
Carolina courts. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Rubens, 166 F.2d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1948); Cleo
Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1943). It is an interesting
question of semantics whether these tests are materially different.
174. Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775
(1976).
175. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
176. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 5.
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